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SUNLIGHT IN THE COUNTY JAIL: HOUCHINS
v. KQED, INC. AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION FOR NEWSGATHERING
By Roberta L. Cairney *
"'Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.'... The district
court order would let a little sunlight in the county jail."'
On March 31, 1975, San Francisco public television station KQED
reported that a prisoner had committed suicide while confined in the
Greystone section of Santa Rita Rehabilitation Center, a jail and pre-
trial detention facility operated by Alameda County.2 According to
KQED's information, inmate Alvin Holly had requested a psychiatric
examination from the superior court, which responded by ordering
such an examination. The county had failed to provide it, however,
and two days later Holly committed suicide.3 KQED's broadcast in-
cluded a statement by a Santa Rita staff psychiatrist that the poor con-
ditions in the Greystone section were responsible for the illnesses of his
prisoner-patients.4 The report also featured Alameda County Sheriff
Thomas Houchins' denial of the psychiatrist's allegations.5
Santa Rita Rehabilitation Center is located in a remote corner of
the county, nearly an hour's drive from Oakland, the county's major
population center.6 Its inmates are pre-trial detainees, persons con-
victed of misdemeanors, and those serving short felony terms.7 Condi-
tions at Santa Rita had been an issue of public concern in the Bay Area
for several years. In 1971, the Federal District Court for the Northern
* B.A., 1976, University of California, Santa Cruz; J.D., 1979, Hastings College of the
Law, University of California.
1. Brief for Respondent at 62, Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978), quoting L.
BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (1914).
2. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 3 (1978).
3. Appendix to Brief for Petitioner, Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (here-
inafter cited as App.).
4. 438 U.S. 1, 3 (1978).
5. Id
6. Neither the county bus district nor the regional rapid transit system serve Santa
Rita. At the time this note was written, a private bus company ran one bus per day to Santa
Rita.
7. Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 135 n.I & 132-35 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See
Brief for Respondent at 33, Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
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District of California s held that conditions there were so poor as to
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.' The court found that "the
subhuman conditions at Greystone could not help but destroy the spirit
and threaten the sanity of the men who had to endure them,"' 0 and that
"Greystone should be razed to the ground."" Following the prisoner's
suicide, KQED reporters sought Sheriff Houchins' permission to tour
Santa Rita with cameras and sound recording equipment in order to
ascertain the nature of conditions there.' 2 Sheriff Houchins denied the
request in accordance with his policy of barring all media access. 
3
KQED subsequently obtained a preliminary injunction in federal court
which enjoined the sheriff from denying reporters access to Santa Rita
and its Greystone section.' 4 The court ruled that KQED and other re-
sponsible members of the news media were to be allowed to use photo-
graphic and sound recording equipment as well as to interview inmates
in order to provide the public with full and accurate coverage of the
Santa Rita jail facilities.'5 As part of its injunction, the court ordered
the sheriff to formulate a new access policy which would balance the
right of the press and the public to gather news against the sheriff's
responsibility to maintain a safe and adequate jail facility.'
6
Sheriff Houchins appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, which upheld the lower court's order.'7 The United States
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's judgment, however, and
remanded the case with instructions to modify the preliminary relief
granted by the district court.'" Only seven justices participated in the
consideration and decision of Houchins v. KQED, Inc., and they split
three ways as to the result.'9 Writing for a three justice plurality, Chief
Justice Burger denied that there is any constitutional protection for
newsgathering.20 He held that the question of press and public access
to investigate the conditions of jails and their inmates requires a legisla-
tive solution.2' Justice Stewart filed a concurring opinion which pro-
8. Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128 (1971).
9. Id at 132-33.
10. Id
11. Id
12. 438 U.S. at 3.
13. Id at 20.
14. App., supra note 3, at 71.
15. Id
16. Id at 69-70.
17. KQED, Inc. v. Houchins, 546 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
18. 438 U.S. at 16.
19. Id Justices Marshall and Blackmun did not take part in the consideration or deci-
sion of the case.
20. ld at 12-16.
21. Id at 12.
vided the swing vote for remand. 22 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Powell and Brennan, filed a dissenting opinion in which he argued that
Sheriff Houchins' refusal to admit reporters with cameras and record-
ing equipment amounted to an official policy of concealing jail condi-
tions from the public, arbitrarily "cutting off the flow of information at
its source" and violating the First Amendment right of the public and
the press to gather information.23
This note focuses on the question of whether the First Amendment
implies a right of press and public access to jails and other public insti-
tutions for newsgathering.24 The first section briefly reviews the histori-
cal, theoretical, and legal bases of freedom of the press, 25 and discusses
two competing views of the purpose of the press clause.26 One view,
held by Justice Stewart and the Houchins plurality, is that the First
Amendment protects the press as an institution. The second view, held
by the dissenting justices in Houchins, is that the Constitution protects
the press' societal function. The two lower court decisions and the
three Supreme Court opinions issued in Houchins are discussed and
analyzed in the second section of the note. The final section illustrates
how the difference between the two interpretations of the purpose of
the press clause adopted by the justices resulted in the split Supreme
Court decision. The conclusion recommends legislative action as the
surest method of protecting the rights of the press and public to gain
access to information about conditions inside public facilities.
I. Freedom of the Press: An Historical, Theoretical and
Legal Background
"Congress shall make no law ...abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press. ..."I
Although the simplicity of the language of the First Amendment
22. Id at 16-19.
23. Id at 38.
24. For background discussions of this issue, see Note, The Right of the Press to Gather
Information, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 838 (1971) (hereinafter cited as COLUMBIA Note); Note,
Public and Press Rights ofAccess to Prisoners After Branzburg and Mandel, 82 YALE L.J.
1337 (1973); Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1505 (1974) (hereinafter cited as HARVARD Note); Comment, The Right of the Press to
Gather Information After Branzburg and Pell, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 166 (1975) (hereinafter
cited as U. PA. Comment); 60 CORNELL L. REV. 446 (1975); 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1524
(1977); 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453 (1976); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 41, 165 (1974).
25. This note is concerned primarily with press and public access to public institutions
for the purpose of ascertaining conditions therein. A detailed discussion of First Amend-
ment principles is beyond its scope.
26. See text accompanying note 27 infra.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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makes determination of its scope and identification of its violation diffi-
cult, the intent of the Framers in expressly mentioning the press28 was
to recognize the need to preserve its freedom, strength and indepen-
dence.2 9 James Madison's preliminary draft of the First Amendment
illustrates this intention: "The people shall not be deprived or abridged
of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments: and the
freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be
inviolable."30
The nature of the recognition afforded the press by the Framers
has led courts to make a series of assumptions which carry substantial
weight whenever questions of limitations upon freedom of the press
arise. First, as a result of its unfettered, intrepid and energetic collec-
tion and dissemination of news, the press is assumed to be the most
important and efficient forum for conveying important information to
the public.3 ' Second, freedom of expression, which includes both the
right of free speech and the right of a free press, 32 must be treated by
28. It has been noted that defining "the press" involves constitutional difficulties. See
HARVARD Note, supra note 24, at 1508, and A. Pickerell, Newsmen's Shield Laws and Sub-
poenas: Calhfornia's Farr and the Fresno Four, 1 COMM/ENT 101, 111-13 (1977). See also
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966). However, such questions are beyond the scope
of this note.
For present purposes, the press shall be defined as those persons eligible for the protec-
tion afforded by the California shield law: "A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person
connected with or employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication,
or by a press association or wire service or any person who has been so connected or em-
ployed. . .[or] a radio or television news reporter or other person connected with or em-
ployed by a radio or television station, or any person who has been so connected or
employed.. . ..." CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1977).
A distinction between the electronic and print media may be inferred from the Supreme
Court decisions in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) and Miami
Herald Publ. Co. v. Tornilo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). That distinction was established in the
context of attempts by the public to gain access to the media. The Court in Miami Herald
held unconstitutional a state reply statute requiring newspapers to publish political candi-
dates' replies to critical editorials. The Court failed to mention its pnor holding, in Red
Lion, that the fairness doctrine, which requires the airing of both sides of public issues, was
valid as applied to the broadcast media. While the distinction becomes important in specific
fact situations when the scope of access is to be determined, the guarantees of the First
Amendment apply equally to each method of reporting. Compare Houchins v. KQED, Inc.
with Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) andSaxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843
(1974).
29. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233, 243-44, 248-50 (1936).
30. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789).
31. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J. concur-
ring); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. at 219; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. at 243-
44, 248-50.
32. "Freedom of expression" is a term which includes both speech and press rights. The
Court tended to use this phrase in its earlier First Amendment cases in which the distinction
between speech and press rights was either unclear or not essential to its decision. See Co-
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the courts with special deference since the institution itself is crucial to
our political system.3 Freedom of speech and of the press, protected
by the First Amendment, has been held to occupy a preferred position
in the legal and political structure of the United States; due to this
preferred position, only a compelling state interest can justify limiting
First Amendment rights.34 Third, the impact of governmental regula-
tions on freedom of speech and of the press must be examined in the
context of the particular fact situation .3  Fourth, regulations affecting
First Amendment interests must be drawn with great precision since
they touch "our most precious freedoms, ' 36 and that broad prevent-
ative rules in the area of free expression are intrinsically suspect.3 7 Fi-
nally, the right to receive as well as the right to disseminate information
is protected by the First Amendment.38 The following sections discuss
various interpretations of the press clause and how they have affected
the extent and nature of constitutional protection for the press.
A. Interpretation of the Press Clause
There are three basic patterns for interpreting "or of the press."39
Freedom of the press is accorded the least protection when the press
clause is considered a mere redundancy. Under this view, the rights of
members of the press are limited to those which all citizens possess
under the speech clause.' The logic underlying this narrow interpreta-
tion is the principle that inexplicitness should be treated as a total fail-
LUMBIA Note, supra note 24, at 840-41 and cases cited therein; HARVARD Note, supra note
24, at 1507; U. PA. Comment, supra note 24, at 172.
33. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 832, 838-39 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. at 243-44, 248-50 (1936); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616 (1919).
34. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39 (1963). The Court held that even penal
interests do not justify broad administrative or executive measures which limit First Amend-
ment rights, unless the government shows that those interests are compelling. See also Mills
v. Alabama, 384 U.S. at 217.
35. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 864 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring);
Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
36. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 838; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 438.
37. 371 U.S. at 438.
38. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 756 (1976); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 832; Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-
65 (1972); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 390; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 564 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965); HARVARD Note,
sufpra note 24, at 1505.
39. Stewart, "Or of the Press" 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975) (hereinafter cited as "Or of
the Press') (excerpted from an address delivered on November 2, 1974, at Yale Law
School).
40. Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy. *hat Does It Add
To Freedom of Speech, 26 HASTINGS L.. 639 (1975); "Or of the Press", supra note 39, at
633; U. PA. Comment, supra note 24, at 174.
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ure to say anything. This is a premise which has no proper role in
constitutional interpretation.' As Justice Stewart noted in an address
delivered at the Yale Law School in 1974, many of the state constitu-
tions drafted before the Federal Constitution contained clauses protect-
ing press freedom "while at the same time recognizing no general
freedom of speech. By including both guarantees in the First Amend-
ment, the Founders quite clearly recognized the distinction between the
two."
4 2
A slightly broader interpretation of the press clause maintains that
the only purpose of the constitutional guarantee is to ensure that the
press serves as a neutral forum for debate and a neutral conduit of
information between citizens and government. 43 Under one variation
of this theory, the constitutional protection available to the press is lim-
ited to the protection against censorship which England afforded its
press at the time our Constitution was adopted.44 Another variation of
this second view limits the press to constitutional protection from
threats perceived by the Founders such as censorship, stamp taxes and
prior restraints. 45 As Justice Stewart also noted in his 1974 speech,
these views are flawed in that they give "insufficient weight to the insti-
tutional autonomy of the press that it was the purpose of the Constitu-
tion to guarantee.
'46
The earliest Supreme Court cases dealing with freedom of expres-
sion focused on the First Amendment's free speech guarantee and
therefore provide little guidance for press questions. 47 "The Court's
decisions dealt with the rights of isolated individuals, or unpopular mi-
nority groups, to stand up against governmental power.. . .The Court
was seldom asked to define the rights and privileges, or the responsibil-
ities of the organized press. '48 In recent years the Court has been
presented with cases concerning such rights, privileges and responsibili-
ties, 49 and in deciding those cases a third interpretation of the press
41. Frantz, Is the First Amendment Lawn-A Response to Professor Mendelson, 51 CALIF.
L. REV. 729, 733-34 (1963).
42. "Or of the Press," supra note 39, at 633-34. See U. PA. Comment, supra note 24, at
174.
43. "Or of the Press," supra note 39, at 634.
44. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. at 248.
45. Id at 248-50.
46. "Or of the Press," supra note 24, at 634. See also Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S.
1, 17 (Stewart, J., concurring).
47. Litigation of First Amendment speech and press claims has a short history. Free-
dom of expression was before the United States Supreme Court for the first time in 1919.
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211
(1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). The first case in which a defendant
succeeded on a First Amendment claim was Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
48. "Or of the Press," supra note 39, at 632.
49. Id at 632-33. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (prior
clause has evolved.
In rejecting the view that the press clause is a mere redundancy,
this third interpretation resembles the second, which limits constitu-
tional protection to preservation of the press as a neutral forum and a
conduit for communication between voters and elected officials. How-
ever, the third interpretation goes further, maintaining that press pro-
tection should not be so narrowly limited because the press provides
more than a "forum" and a "conduit;" it recognizes instead that the
press plays an active role in our social and political structure.
B. Broader Protection for the Press
Support for the broader structural or functional interpretation of
the First Amendment is found in a number of Supreme Court opinions.
In Mills v. Alabama,5" which held unconstitutional a statute forbidding
newspapers to publish political editorials on election day, Justice Black
wrote for the majority:
The Constitution specifically selected the press . . to play an
important role in the discussion of public affairs. Thus the press
serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any
abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitution-
ally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people re-
sponsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve.
51
Protection is thus bestowed on the press because it performs one of the
most vital functions in a democratic society: the collection and dissem-
ination of information to the citizens. Separate and distinct rights
which reside solely in the press and which are not derived from the free
speech rights of individuals have therefore been recognized.52 It has
been said that the government is prohibited from censoring the press
because the duty of the press is to censure the government.
5 3
restraints and judicial "gag" orders); Miami Herald Publ. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974) (invalidating state "right to reply" statute); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S.
843 (1974) (companion case to Pel); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (denying press
claim of a right to interview specific prison inmates on request); Branzburg v Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972) (denying press claim of privilege against testifying before grand juries);
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (press liability for invasion of privacy); Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (right of criminal defendant to be tried without undue public-
ity); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (right of newspapers to publish political editori-
als on election day); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (press liability for
defamation); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (tax on newspapers);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 679 (1931) (prior restraint).
50. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
51. Id at 219.
52. "Or ofthe Press," supra note 39, at 635-36. For similar views expressed with reser-
vations, see HARVARD Note, supra note 24, at 1506. Butsee U. PA. Comment, supra note 24,
at 174.
53. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 717 (Black, J., concurring). Ten
opinions were written in this case. A per curiam opinion, representing the views of six jus-
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Protection of the function of the press is not jeopardized by the
commercial or sensationalist motives of publishers, editors or report-
ers.5 4 Although it cannot be disputed that editors of the print and
broadcast media sometimes abuse their power in selecting and editing
news material, the Supreme Court has held that this lack of editorial
discretion does not negate constitutional protection." Such protection
of the press is not bestowed by the Constitution for the personal benefit
of reporters and editors, but rather for the benefit of all the people. 6
The Court has consistently declined to extend First Amendment pro-
tection to the press when it has found that the interests of the public
and the press diverged. When press and public interests are consistent,
however, the Court has extended constitutional protection to the
press.
5 7
Coincidence of press and public interests led the Court to establish
a protective standard of press liability in defamation cases which fur-
thers the public interest in vigorous and unrestrained debate.5 The
public interest in diverse ideas and unconventional expression has at
times also been the basis for decisions extending First Amendment pro-
tection to the press in obscenity cases. 9 In contrast, the divergence of
press claims and the public interest caused the Court to limit the rights
of the broadcast media in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. i'. FCC.60 There
the court upheld an FCC rule requiring broadcasters to present the
views of responsible spokespersons on controversial issues in order to
tices, held that the government, which sought to prevent publication of the "Pentagon Pa-
pers," had not shown a sufficient justification to impose a prior restraint on the New York
Times. 403 U.S. at 714. In addition to the per curiam opinion, the individual justices pro-
duced six concurrences and three dissents.
54. In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), the Court held that a gag
order imposed by a trial court judge during the trial of an alleged mass murderer was an
unconstitutional prior restraint. Id at 570. Chief Justice Burger found that the case juxta-
posed the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press with the Sixth Amendment
right to an impartial jury trial, and that the First Amendment interests Aere controlling. He
reiterated the position he had previously taken in Miami Herald Publ. Co. v. Tomillo, 418
U.S. 241, 256 (1974), see note 28 supra, that press responsibility, although desirable, is not
mandated by the Constitution, whereas freedom of the press is so protected. 427 U.S. at 560.
55. "Calculated risks of abuse are taken in order to preserve higher values .... [Tlhe
authors of the Bill of Rights accepted the reality that these risks were evils for which there
was no acceptable remedy other than a spirit of moderation and a sense of responsibility-
and civility-on the part of those who exercise the guaranteed freedom of expression." Co-
lumbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm'n, 412 U.S. 94, 125 (1973).
See James Madison's comments in 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794).
56. First Amendment protections "are not so much for the benefit of the press so much
as for the benefit of all of us." Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967).
57. See generally HARVARD Note, supra note 24.
58. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
59. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 484-88 (1957).
60. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See note 28 supra.
promote the public interest in receiving varied opinions. By compel-
ling broadcasters to air statements by speakers whose messages meet
judicial or administrative standards of relevance to matters of public
concern, the Court enhanced rather than abridged the right of free ex-
61pression.
Judicial reluctance to extend First Amendment protection to press
activities which conflict with fundamental public interests was made
clear in Branzburg v. Hayes,62 where the Court refused to sanction a
reporter's privilege to refuse to testify before grand juries investigating
crime. The reporters contended that the First Amendment protected
their right to gather news and that forcing them to testify and reveal
their sources would hamper their ability to do so, thereby abridging
their constitutional rights.63 Balancing the broad investigatory powers
of the grand jury, which might potentially deter news sources from fur-
nishing information, against a privilege which would directly limit
those powers, the Court denied the reporter's claims in a five to four
decision.64
Branzburg presented the Court with the claim that newsgathering
is constitutionally protected. 65 The question of First Amendment pro-
tection for such activities had reached the Court before, but not in the
form of a claim asserted by the press.66 In one case, a private citizen
had attacked the State Department's refusal to validate his passport for
travel to Cuba on the ground that the refusal violated his First Amend-
61. The Court similarly rejected the press' claim in Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1 (1945), that the First Amendment precluded the application of the antitrust laws
to the press.
62. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
63. Id at 679-80.
64. Id at 690-91. Four justices held against the privilege; four supported it. Justice
Powell's concurring opinion is so narrowly phrased and constructed that some commenta-
tors have characterized the decision as 4-1/2 to 4-1/2. "Or ofthe Press", supra note 39, at
635; THE MEDIA AND THE LAW 12 (Simons & Califano, Jr. eds. 1976) (hereinafter cited as
Simons & Calfano).
The majority opinion recognized some constitutional protection for newsgathering. 408
U.S. at 681, 707. Justice Powell also noted the existence of that protection. Id at 709 (Pow-
ell, J., concurring). The dissenters acknowledged such a constitutional right. Id at 729
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
65. Id at 679-81. Branzburg had written an article describing illicit drug activities in
Kentucky. The second petitioner, Pappas, had been inside a Black Panther headquarters
while preparations were made for a police raid. Caldwell, the third petitioner, had gained
the confidence of Black Panther Party leaders in California. All three reporters were sub-
poenaed by grand juries to answer questions regarding their sources.
66. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-65 (1972) (acknowledging the consti-
tutional right of private citizens to receive information but denying that the right was
abridged by exclusion of an alien Marxist scholar from the United States); Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1 (1965) (held that the First Amendment was not violated by a State Department
regulation which prohibited private citizens from visiting Cuba).
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ment right to gather information.6 7 In another, a group of American
scholars maintained that the denial of a visa to a Belgian Marxist vio-
lated their constitutional right of access to information and opinion.6"
In both cases, the Court based its denial of First Amendment protec-
tion on the specific facts underlying the controversies;6" the Court did
not deny that in a suitable set of circumstances, newsgathering may be
entitled to constitutional protection.7"
All nine justices in Branzburg recognized that newsgathering is
protected by the First Amendment, despite the majority's denial of the
specific press claim of entitlement to a testimonial privilege.7" How-
ever, the majority qualified the scope of the constitutional protection
for newsgathering by listing places from which the press might legiti-
mately be excluded: deliberative executive and judicial proceedings, as
well as the scenes of disasters, emergencies, and catastrophes involving
physical danger.7 2 Nevertheless, such limitations on the scope of con-
stitutional protection for newsgathering were not a denial of its exist-
ence. In the words of Justice White's majority opinion: "We do not
question the significance of free speech, press, or assembly to the coun-
try's welfare. Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify
for First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking
out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated."73
Although Branzburg has been cited in subsequent opinions involv-
ing press access issues, it is important to note that source protection
rather than access was at issue in that case, and that the Court's com-
ments regarding press access were dicta.74 The Court pointed out that
its holding involved "no restraint on what newspapers may publish or
on the type or quality of information reporters may seek to ac-
quire. . . ."I' It was therefore unnecessary for the Court to explore a
67. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
68. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
69. 408 U.S. at 762-63; 381 U.S. at 17.
70. 408 U.S. at 770; 381 U.S. at 16; See also cases following Kleindienst and Zemel,
which continue to recognize constitutional protection for newsgathering: Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. at 833-34; Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 858 (Powell, J., dissenting
opinion).
71. See note 64 supra.
72. 408 U.S. at 684-85. Following the decision, two of the three reporters were recalled
by the respective grand juries. A substantial increase in subpoenas to newspersons has oc-
curred as a result of the decision which, at the very least, chills freedom of the press by
increasing the legal costs to publishers and reporters. Simons & Califano, supra note 64, at
14.
73. 408 U.S. at 681.
74. The Court noted that "[t]he sole issue before us is the obligation of reporters to
respond to grand jury subpoenas relevant to the commission of crime," Id at 682.
75. Id at 691.
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fundamental distinction between two competing views of the press
clause.
C. The Purpose of Constitutional Protection for the Press-Structure
v. Function
As the third interpretation of the scope of the press clause has been
developed, two diverging views have arisen as to the purpose underly-
ing constitutional protection for the press. One view justifies broad
press protection on the ground that the press clause is a structural pro-
vision of the Constitution that protects the press as an institution. This
argument was propounded by Justice Stewart in his Yale Law School
address,76 and was reflected in his majority opinions in two 1974 press
access cases, Pell v. Procunier7i and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.7"
The other view advocates broad protection for the press based on the
belief that the press clause is designed to preserve the societal function
of the press-the collection, analysis and dissemination of information
and ideas. This view was expressed by Justice Powell in his dissenting
opinion in Saxbe7 9 and by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Houchins v.
KQED, Inc. 
8 0
Justice Stewart has argued that the press clause should be inter-
preted as a structural provision:
[T]he Free Press guarantee is, in essence, a structural provision of
the Constitution. Most of the other provisions in the Bill of
Rights protect specific liberties or specific rights of individuals:
freedom of speech, freedom of worship, the right to counsel, the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, to name a few.
In contrast, the Free Press Clause extends protection to an insti-
tution. The publishing business is, in short, the only organized
private business that is given explicit constitutional protection.8"
This structural view protects the press against discriminatory govern-
mental regulations such as prior restraints, but it affords no protection
against non-discriminatory governmental restraints on newsgathering
such as policies prohibiting all first-hand access to government infor-
mation and public institutions. The extent of access to governmental
institutions for newsgathering is to be determined by "the tug and pull
of the political forces in American society" rather than on the basis of
First Amendment interests.8" This interpretation of the press clause
76. "Or of the Press," supra note 39, at 633.
77. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
78. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
79. 417 U.S. at 850 (Powell, J., dissenting).
80. 438 U.S. at 30 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. "Or of the Press," supra note 39 at 633 (emphasis in original).
82. Id at 636 (cited by Burger, C.J., in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. at 15).
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therefore rejects the concept of special constitutional protection for
newsgathering.
In contrast, the view that bases First Amendment protection on
preservation of the societal function of the press requires constitutional
protection for newsgathering. Without ideas and information to assem-
ble and analyze, the press has little of value to convey to the public and
the ability of the people to govern themselves is seriously damaged. 3
Professor Chafee pointed out in Free Speech in the United States14 that
the guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press extend beyond the
individual citizen:
There is an individual interest, the need of many [citizens] to
express their opinions on matters vital to them if life is to be
worth living, and a social interest in the attainment of truth, so
that the country may not only adopt the wisest course of action
but carry it out in the wisest way.
Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.
8 6
quoted this passage and set out the functional view of the press clause:
In its usual application-as a bar to governmental restraints on
speech or publication-the First Amendment protects important
values of individual expression and personal self-fulfillment. But
where as here, the Government imposes neither a penalty on
speech nor any sanction against publication, these individualistic
values of the First Amendment are not directly implicated.
What is at stake . . . is the societal function of the First
Amendment in preserving free public discussion of governmental
affairs. ....
[The societal function of the First Amendment] embodies our
Nation's commitment to popular self-determination and our
abiding faith that the surest course for developing sound national
policy lies in a free exchange of views on public issues.8 7
Press access cases such as Houchins turn on the Court's interpreta-
tion of the purpose of the press clause. The structural interpretation
precludes constitutional scrutiny of regulations which do not discrimi-
nate between the press and the public, no matter what impact they have
on the flow of information and opinion. The functional interpretation
requires careful scrutiny of the regulation's effect and of the govern-
ment interest which it serves. The difference between the scope of con-
stitutional protection of press access for newsgathering afforded by
these two views of the First Amendment emerged in two cases decided
by the Court in 1974.
83. 438 U.S. at 32-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting) and authorities cited therein.
84. Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1954).
85. Id at 33.
86. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
87. Id at 862 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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D. Pre-Houchins Press Access Cases: Pell v. Procunier and Saxbe v.
Washington Post
Since the Branzburg ruling,"8 the Court has decided two cases (be-
sides Houchins) in which the press has attempted to establish constitu-
tional protection for newsgathering. Pell v. Procunier89 and Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co. 90 raised the issue of the press right to gather news
within state and federal prisons. Both cases presented the question of
whether prison regulations which denied professional journalists the
opportunity to interview particular inmates violated the First Amend-
ment. 91
In Pell, four California state prison inmates and three professional
journalists challenged the constitutionality of a California Department
of Corrections regulation which prohibited interviews with inmates
who had been specifically designated by the press.92 The rule had been
promulgated following a violent escape attempt at San Quentin Prison
that authorities partially attributed to their former policy of allowing
reporters face-to-face interviews with particular inmates upon re-
quest.93 Prison administrators felt that the policy had contributed to
prison unrest in that the relatively small number of men interviewed
had gained disproportionate notoriety and influence among the other
inmates.9 4 A three-judge federal district court held that the rule vio-
lated the prisoners' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights but dis-
missed the journalists' claims that their constitutionally protected right
to gather news had been illegally infringed.95 The state prison authori-
ties appealed the ruling which granted the prisoners' claims and the
journalists appealed the ruling which denied them a right of access.9 6
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment in favor of the prisoners
and affirmed the dismissal of the press claims.9 7
In Saxbe,9s a newspaper and one of its reporters challenged a sim-
ilar policy of the federal prison system which permitted press inter-
views only with individually designated inmates jailed in minimum
security facilities.9 9 The district court held that the policy was uncon-
88. See notes 62-64 and 71-75 and accompanying text supra.
89. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
90. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
91. 417 U.S. at 829; 417 U.S. at 849-50.
92. 417 U.S. at 819.
93. Id at 831.
94. Id
95. Hillery v. Procunier, 364 F. Supp. 196, 200 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
96. 417 U.S. at 821.
97. Id at 827-28, 835.
98. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
99. Id at 844.
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stitutional' ° and the government appealed the judgment to the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which remanded the case for
further findings.10' The district court reaffirmed its prior decision"0 2
and the circuit court affirmed that holding.'0 3 Relying on Pell, the
Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, holding that the regulation
did not abridge freedom of the press because it was not discrimina-
tory-the press was not denied access to sources of information avail-
able to members of the general public.'0"
In both cases, the Court noted that the prison administrations
granted substantial access to the press in excess of that accorded the
general public, 105 and that there had been no attempts to conceal prison
conditions.'0 6 Although the public and the press were subject to differ-
ent access regulations, the Pell Court found that both groups were al-
lowed "full opportunities to observe prison conditions" inside the
walls. 107 Citing Branzburg v. Hayes' and repeating the list of situa-
tions from which the press is regularly and permissibly excluded,109 the
Pell court once again recognized that the public and the press share the
constitutionally protected right to gather news." 0 In neither case was
the press absolutely barred by informal administrative policy as it was
in Houchins.
The Court based its holdings on Justice White's dictum in
Branzburg that "[i]t has been generally held that the First Amendment
does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access not
available to the public generally.""' Justice Stewart expressed the rule
in his opinion for the Pell majority: "[N]ewsmen have no constitu-
tional right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded
the general public.""' 2 In neither Pell nor Saxbe did the Court con-
sider whether this rule would apply to a case in which no access at all
was allowed. Nor did either opinion, after equating the press and pub-
lic rights of access to gather news, define the extent of constitutional
protection for either interest." 3
These cases illustrate the dichotomy between the view that the
100. 357 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1972).
101. 477 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
102. 357 F. Supp. 779 (D.D.C. 1972).
103. 494 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
104. 417 U.S. at 850.
105. 417 U.S. at 830-31; 417 U.S. at 847, 849.
106. 417 U.S. at 830; 417 U.S. at 848.
107. 417 U.S. at 830.
108. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). See notes 62-64 and 71-75 and accompanying text supra.
109. 417 U.S. at 833-34.
110. Id at 834.
111. 408 U.S. at 684.
112. 417 U.S. at 834.
113. See KQED, Inc. v. Houchins, 546 F.2d at 295 (Hufstedler, J., concurring).
First Amendment protects the press as an institution or structural ele-
ment of our society and the view that it protects the function of the
press and therefore access to gather information. However, the differ-
ence did not become clear until the Court was presented with Houchins
v. KQED, Inc., a case in which access was, in practical terms, com-
pletely denied.
II. Houchins v. I(QED, Inc.
The language of the First Amendment and the historical context of
its adoption justify reading the press clause as a structural provision
protecting the societal function of the press as an institution.11 4 Nar-
rower constructions of the meaning and function of the syntactically
separate guarantee of freedom of the press have been noted by the
courts but generally discarded.' 15
When it first began construing the free speech and press guaran-
tees, the Supreme Court was not presented with cases raising questions
as to the rights and responsibilities that pertain to the gathering and
dissemination of news. As the number of cases raising these issues has
increased, however, the Court's opinions have indicated a general ac-
ceptance of the proposition that the First Amendment protects the press
as an institution which performs a crucial role in our political and so-
cial structure. Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Houchins exemplifies
this view:
It is equally true that with greater information, the public can
more intelligently form opinions. . . . Beyond question, the role
of the media is important; acting as the "eyes and ears" of the
public, they can be a powerful and constructive force, contribut-
ing to remedial action in the conduct of public business. They
have served that function since the beginning of the Repub-
lic . ... 116
Prior to the Houchins decision the Court had recognized-in par-
ticular, limited circumstances-a constitutionally protected right to
gather news. In Pell and Saxbe it rejected First Amendment chal-
lenges to prison rules and policies limiting press access to interview
specified inmates. However, those cases can be distinguished from
Houchins in that both the California prison authorities in Pell and the
federal authorities in Saxbe allowed substantial press and public access
that was not impaired by upholding the regulations at issue. The ques-
tion that remained open, and which was a major factor in splitting the
Houchins Court, is whether administrators violate the First Amend-
114. See notes 76-80 and accompanying text, supra.
115. See notes 36-50 and accompanying text, supra.
116. 438 U.S. at 8.
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ment by totally denying the public and the press access to public insti-
tutions (such as jails) to gather information regarding conditions.
A. Lower Court Decisions In Houchins v. KQED, Ine.
1. The District Court
Following Sheriff Houchins' refusal to allow reporters to tour
Santa Rita with cameras and sound recording equipment, KQED and
two local branches of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People filed suit against him under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.117
They alleged that the sheriff had violated their First Amendment rights
by arbitrarily refusing to permit media access and failing to provide
any effective means by which the public could learn about conditions
inside the jail.I"
There was no formal access policy regarding either the public or
the press when KQED filed suit in June, 1975.119 Shortly thereafter,
the sheriff instituted a program of public tours at Santa Rita; one tour
was to be held each month for a period of six months. 120 Each tour was
limited to twenty-five persons, and did not include the cell portions of
the Greystone facility. The use of cameras and communication with
inmates was prohibited.'' KQED moved for a preliminary injunction
prohibiting the sheriff from "excluding KQED news personnel from
the Greystone cells . . . and generally preventing full and accurate
news coverage of the conditions prevailing therein."' 22 In opposing the
injunction the sheriff contended that the public tours, together with the
inmates' mail and visiting privileges, afforded adequate media ac-
cess. 
123
After the first four monthly tours had taken place, the district court
held a hearing on KQED's motion. It was shown that KQED had ex-
tensive experience in reporting about jail and prison conditions and
117. Id 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects. or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party so injured in an action of law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceedings for redress."
States are prohibited from abridging the freedom of speech or of the press by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. at
243. Any due process or equal protection questions raised by Houchins V_ KQED, Inc., are
outside the scope of this note, since they were not at issue there and the Court did not
consider them.
118. 438 U.S. at 4; id at 21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. Id at 4 (majority opinion).
120. Id
121. Id at 4-5.
122. Id at 4.
123. App., supra note 3, at 67.
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inmates.2 4 Its reporters had been granted access with cameras and re-
cording equipment to various California correctional facilities; no dis-
turbances or problems had occurred on any of those occasions.' 25 The
reporters testified that precautions were taken to protect the privacy of
prisoners.12 6 No pictures were taken of anyone who did not wish to be
photographed, nor was anyone interviewed without his or her knowl-
edge and consent. Written releases were routinely obtained from any
inmates who ultimately appeared in KQED's television programs.
2 7
Affidavits of local correctional officers other than Sheriff Houchins and
those of various Bay Area news reporters described the more liberal
access policies of other penal institutions and uniformly expressed the
opinion that first-hand coverage of conditions at such institutions by
professional reporters had no harmful consequences. Sheriff Houchins
stated that since Santa Rita had never experimented with a more lib-
eral press access policy than that in existence at the time of the hearing,
there had never been press disturbances at the jail.128 He also admitted
that he had no knowledge of any disruptions caused by the media at
other penal institutions.'29
Evidence was also introduced concerning the adequacy of the tour
program instituted by the sheriff. All six tours had been completely
booked shortly after they were announced, and it was uncertain
whether they would be continued after the first six months. The tours
did not enter the Greystone facility and thus avoided the most trouble-
some and controversial area. Inmates were kept out of sight during the
tour, and visitors were not allowed to photograph jail conditions. The
county offered photographs for sale to tour visitors, but those photo-
graphs did not depict all of the areas visited. 3 In addition, the photo-
graphs were taken from angles which omitted catwalks and television
monitors by which inmates were subject to surveillance.'
3 '
The district court found that the broad restraints on access to
Santa Rita were not required by legitimate penological interests and
that under the sheriffs policy KQED was afforded no access at all. 32
Sheriff Houchins was enjoined from excluding KQED and other re-
sponsible members of the news media or preventing them from provid-
ing full and accurate coverage of the conditions in the entire jail,
124. 438 U.S. at 19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. App., supra note 3, at 8-12.
126. Id at 69.
127. Id at 11, 14.
128. Id at 69.
129. Id
130. Id at 68.
131. Id See 438 U.S. at 23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132. App., supra note 3, at 69-70. See 438 U.S. at 23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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including the Greystone section.'33 The sheriff was ordered to establish
reasonable "time and hour restrictions" for press access, although he
was given discretion to deny access "for the duration of those limited
periods when tensions in the jail make such media access danger-
ous."'134 The court further ordered that KQED and other members of
the press be allowed to use cameras and sound equipment and to inter-
view inmates, in order to provide the public with adequate reports on
the conditions inside the Santa Rita facilities.'35 On the basis of the
testimony presented, the court was satisfied that such access would not
endanger the prisoners' privacy.
136
The district judge noted that as long as the sheriffs access regula-
tions and policies were consistent with the constitutional rights of the
press and the public, their specific details should be determined by the
sheriff rather than the court:
In fashioning the form of preliminary injunction, however,
the Court has carefully refrained from usurping the Sheriff's role
as jail administrator. By way of this Memorandum the Court
merely notes that meaningful press access to a jail includes some
use of cameras and inmate interviews. The specific methods of
implementing such a policy must be determined by Sheriff
Houchins. Of course, should a situation arise in which jail ten-
sions or other special circumstances make such implementation
dangerous, defendant can restrict media access for the duration
of such circumstances.
137
The sheriff had relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Pell v.
Procunier138 in arguing for denial of the preliminary injunction.'
39
The district court distinguished Pell from Houchins on the grounds that
KQED, unlike the media plaintiffs in Pell, had no access to Santa Rita
at the time the suit was filed and that KQED was merely seeking the
type of access that the media was granted in other California state pris-
ons both before and after the Pell decision:
[T]he [PelM Court carefully noted that the subject regulation was
not designed to frustrate media investigation and reporting of
prison conditions and that the media has access not only to a
program of public tours but also to interviews of inmates selected
at random-precisely the access sought by plaintiffs in this case.
Therefore this Court reads Pell as standing for the proposition
that a prison or jail administrator may curtail media access upon
a showing of past resultant disruption or present institutional ten-
133. App., supra note 3, at 71.
134. Id
135. Id
136. Id. at 69.
137. Id at 69-70.
138. 417 U.S. 817 (1974). See notes 92-97 and 105-113 and accompanying text supra.
139. App., supra note 3, at 67.
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sions. Defendant has not made such a showing in this case. 140
The district court thus held that the First Amendment mandates
press and public access to jails to gather information about conditions
therein, that Sheriff Houchins' policy violated the First Amendment,
and that Pell did not compel identical access rules for the press and the
public. This judgment was appealed.
2 The Ninth Circuit Decision
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
preliminary injunction.14 1 Citing Branzburg v. Hayes4 2 and Pell, the
Ninth Circuit stated that "[c]learly, the First Amendment grants the
news media a constitutionally protected right to gather news."' 43 The
appellate court also approved the test of constitutionality which it con-
cluded had been applied to Sheriff Houchins' access policy by the dis-
trict court. Under this test, formulated in United States v. O'Brien,'" a
restriction on First Amendment rights can be upheld only if it furthers
an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to sup-
pressing speech, and then only if the restriction is the least drastic
means of furthering that interest.
145
Having approved the test used by the lower court as well as its
application of that standard, the Ninth Circuit also approved the scope
of the preliminary injunction. The constitutional rule establishing
equal access rights 46 was interpreted to allow flexible application and
separate rules for the press that would differ from those imposed upon
the public: "Although both groups have an equal constitutional right of
access to jails, because of differing needs and administrative problems,
140. Id at 67-68.
141. 546 F.2d at 286.
142. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). See notes 62-64 and 71-75 and accompanying text supra.
143. 546 F.2d at 285. Each of the three Ninth Circuit judges filed an opinion in KQED,
Inc. v. Houchins. Judge Pregerson wrote the main opinion, which is discussed in the text
accompanying these footnotes. Judge Duniway filed a concurring opinion in which he ex-
pressed doubt that the flexibility necessary for the proper administration of the right to
gather news had been recognized or was allowable under the Pell holding. 546 F.2d at 295.
Judge Hufstedler filed a special concurrence emphasizing the necessity of flexibility in the
implementation of the equal access order and "that a candid view of prisons and prison life
is not possible if both the news media and the general public are limited to white glove
inspections at hours and on days scheduled by prison administrators for their own conven-
ience." 546 F.2d at 296.
144. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
145. 546 F.2d at 286. Although the district court did not give specific consideration to
selection of the appropriate constitutional standard of review, the structure and language of
its memorandum and order support the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the lower court had
granted the injunction on the ground that Houchins' policy was not the least drastic means
of furthering legitimate government policy in view of the substantial restriction on First
Amendment interests.
146. See notes 86-113 and accompanying text supra.
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common sense mandates that the implementation of those correlative
rights not be identical."' 47 The court recommended that the sheriff
consider the press access policy of federal prisons and appended the
official statement of that policy to its opinion. 148 No mention was made
of any necessity for legislative action to support a right of access to
public institutions to ascertain conditions.
The appellate court thus found that Sheriff Houchins' policy vio-
lated the First Amendment right to gather news, that Pell did not re-
quire identical regulations for the press and the public, and that the
district court's injunction was an appropriate remedy. 4 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari,150 and subsequently reversed the lower courts.
B. The Supreme Court Opinions
The Supreme Court split three ways in Houchins ;. KQED, Inc. 1
Only seven justices participated in the decision. 52 Three justices voted
for reversal, Justice Stewart concurred but noted that further relief
should be available to KQED on remand and the remaining three jus-
tices voted to affirm the injunction. Although four justices agreed that
the district court's injunction was too broad, no more than one-third of
the Court agreed as to the controlling legal theories-the views of the
justices who voted for reversal were far from the positions of the three
dissenting justices who voted to affirm.
-1 Chief Justice Burger's Plurality Opinion
Writing for a plurality of the Court, Chief Justice Burger charac-
terized the question presented by Sheriff Houchins' appeal as "whether
the news media have a constitutional right of access to a county jail,
over and above that of other persons, to interview inmates and make
sound recordings, films, and photographs for publication and broad-
casting by newspapers, radio, and television."' 53 He noted that the
sheriff had instituted his limited monthly tours shortly after the suit was
filed and that, based on the sheriffs mail, telephone and visiting regula-
tions, other "means [existed] by which information concerning the jail
could reach the public."' 5 4 The mail regulations allowed inmates to
send an unlimited number of letters to judges, attorneys involved in
their cases and various law enforcement and prison officials; those reg-
147. 546 F.2d at 286.
148. Id
149. Id
150. 431 U.S. 928 (1977).
151. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
152. Justices Marshall and Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case. Id at 2.
153. Id at 3.
154. Id at 6.
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ulations also allowed prisoners to send a limited number of letters to
other persons. 55 Anyone personally acquainted with an inmate was
allowed to visit him or her, although visiting periods and areas were
designated by the sheriff. Those who did not know inmates were not
allowed such visits or interviews. 56 The Chief Justice included the
provision allowing maximum security prisoners free access to tele-
phones to make unmonitored collect phone calls in his list of signifi-
cant sources of information concerning jail conditions.1 57 He did not
address KQED's contention that neither the tours nor the mail, visita-
tion and telephone rules afforded any opportunity for the press or the
public to verify at first hand stories received through these channels,
and that responsible newspeople could not present substantial, mean-
ingful reports on jail conditions when they were limited to unverified
and unverifiable sources. Nor did he recognize that KQED sought
only non-confidential information concerning the physical conditions
inside Santa Rita and its Greystone section. In describing the district
court's findings the Chief Justice noted that the court had rejected
Sheriff Houchins' argument that press access would endanger prisoner
privacy, but he did not allude to the court's positive finding, based on
substantial evidence submitted during the hearing, that press policy
and past practice proved that prisoners' privacy, could be easily and
adequately protected. 5
8
The Chief Justice stated that he agreed with "many of the respon-
dents' [KQED's]. . .assertions"-that jails are clearly matters of great
public importance and that the press "can be a powerful and construc-
tive force, contributing to remedial action in the conduct of public busi-
ness." 5 9 He echoed Justice Stewart's structural interpretation of the
press clause by noting that the press is one of the "components of our
society .... ,160 Following a brief description of the role of the press,
he concluded, without citation to any authority, that "[t]he public im-
portance of conditions in penal facilities and the media's role of provid-
ing information afford no basis for ...a right ... to enter these
institutions, with camera equipment, and take moving and still pictures
of inmates for broadcast purposes."'1
61
Having stated his conclusion, the Chief Justice criticized KQED's
reliance on the prior Supreme Court decisions in Grosjean v. American




158. Id at 7.
159. Id at 8.
160. Id
161. Id at 9.
162. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
163. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
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guage in those cases concerning the purpose of constitutional protec-
tion for the press and had argued that the First Amendment guarantees
encompass both the gathering and the dissemination of news. In Gros-
jean the Court struck down a newspaper tax164 and in Mills it invali-
dated a statute prohibiting the publication of political editorials on
election day.165 Neither case involved any question of press access to
public institutions. In Chief Justice Burger's opinion, these cases did
not support KQED's claim since they "did not remotely imply a consti-
tutional right guaranteeing anyone access to government information
beyond that open to the public generally."' 166 He discounted KQED's
reliance on language concerning the purpose of the press clause on the
ground that Houchins' access regulations were too dissimilar to the spe-
cific governmental restrictions struck down in those cases. 167
The Chief Justice used a contrasting approach in his analysis of
more recent decisions in which claims of constitutional protection for
newsgathering had been raised. In discussing Branzburg v. Hayes,16 a
case concerning source protection and testimonial privilege, and Zemel
v. Rusk, 169 which did not even involve the press, he went beyond their
narrow fact situations and specific questions presented and expanded
the Court's general language to fit the issues raised by Houchins.
Branzburg involved the claims of three newsmen to a constitutionally
based reporters' privilege against testifying before grand juries. "That
the Court assumed in Branzburg that there is no First Amendment
right of access to information is manifest," Chief Justice Burger found,
from Justice White's dicta that the press does not have a "constitutional
right of special access to information not available to the public gener-
ally" and that news reporters may be excluded from "scenes of crime or
disaster when the general public is excluded."' 70 The Chief Justice also
found that "[t]he appellant in Zemel made essentially the same argu-
ment" that KQED made in Houchins. 7 In Zemel the appellant, a pri-
vate citizen, contended that the State Department's ban on travel to
Cuba "interfered with his First Amendment right to acquaint himself
with the effects of our Government's foreign. . . policies and the con-
ditions in Cuba that might affect those policies."1 2 Chief Justice Bur-
ger stated that the Court's denial of Zemel's constitutional argument
164. 297 U.S. at 251.
165. 384 U.S. at 218.
166. 438 U.S. at 10.
167. Id at 8-10.
168. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). See notes 62-64 and 71-75 and accompanying text supra.
169. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
170. 438 U.S. at 11 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 684, 685 (1972) (emphasis
added)).
171. 438 U.S. at 11.
172. Id at 11-12.
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"further negates any notion that the First Amendment confers a right
of access to news sources."
' 173
In the Chief Justice's view, Pell v. Procunier74 and Saxbe v. Wash-
ington Post Co. 175 controlled Houchins, since he found that KQED was
seeking special access beyond that granted to the public.'76 He rejected
the contention that the Constitution entitles the public and the press to
some degree of access to public institutions to gain first-hand informa-
tion regarding conditions therein, and held that such access "is a ques-
tion of policy which a legislative body might appropriately resolve one
way or the other."' 177 Here again Chief Justice Burger echoed Justice
Stewart's view that non-discriminatory regulations do not present con-
stitutional questions no matter what impact they have on the function
of the press.' 78 He quoted Justice Stewart's 1974 address to the Yale
Law School for the proposition that the free press and free speech guar-
antees inure to the press as an institution. The Constitution protects
only "'the contest [for information], not its resolution. . . .For the
rest, we must rely. on the tug and pull of the political forces in
American society.' ,179
In concluding his opinion, the Chief Justice combined his rejection
of the lower courts' decisions with a denial of the ability of federal trial
courts to determine the scope of First Amendment protection:
Because the Constitution affords no guidelines, absent statutory
standards, hundreds of judges would, under the Court of Ap-
peals' approach, be at large to fashion ad hoc standards, in indi-
vidual cases, according to their own ideas of what seems to be
"desirable" or "expedient." We, therefore, reject the Court of
Appeals' conclusory assertion that the public and the media have
a First Amendment right to government information regarding
the conditions of jails and their inmates and presumably all other
public facilities such as hospitals and mental institutions.1
8 0
The Chief Justice's opinion was joined by Justices White and Rehn-
quist and constituted the judgment of the Court.
2 Justice Stewart's Concurrence
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion suggests an acceptance of
173. Id at 11. This reasoning ignores the discrepancies in the analogy between Zemel's
individual claim that he had a First Amendment right to investigate conditions in Cuba and
those of KQED and the NAACP to access to a local county jail to ascertain non-confidential
information concerning conditions therein.
174. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
175. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
176. See notes 86-113 and accompanying text supra.
177. 438 U.S. at 12.
178. See notes 81-82 and accompanying text supra.
179. Id at 14-15, quoting "Or of the Press," supra note 39, at 636.
180. 438 U.S. at 14.
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Chief Justice Burger's statement of the issue before the Court. He
found that the injunction was unwarranted to the extent that it was
inconsistent with Pell and Saxbe in granting the press greater access
rights than those granted to the public:
In two respects . . the District Court's preliminary injunction
was overbroad. It ordered the Sheriff to permit reporters into the
Little Greystone facility and it required him to let them interview
randomly encountered inmates. In both these respects, the in-
junction gave the press access to areas and sources of information
from which persons, on the public tours had been excluded, and
thus enlarged the scope of what the Sheriff and Supervisors had
opened to public view. The District Court erred in concluding
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments compelled this
broader access for the press.
181
Like the Chief Justice, Justice Stewart did not question the applicabil-
ity of Pell and Saxbe to Houchins. However, unlike Chief Justice Bur-
ger, he approved those parts of the injunction which provided for press
access distinct from that allowed by the public tour program, and
which allowed the press to use cameras and sound equipment in order
to prepare full and accurate reports on jail conditions.18 2 His partial
approval of the lower courts' remedy was based on his belief that flex-
ibility is essential in applying the Pell-Saxbe equal access rule.
18 3
Despite his belief that the concept of equal access must be ac-
corded flexibility in order to accommodate the practical distinctions be-
tween the needs of the press and the public, Justice Stewart would still
uphold exclusionary regulations or policies as long as they did not dis-
criminate between the public and the press.18 4 He believed that KQED
was entitled to relief solely because the tour program instituted by the
sheriff did not give the press effective access equal to that given the
public in that the press was not allowed to use the audio-visual tools of
its trade."8 5 By finding the district court injunction overbroad, Justice
Stewart provided the vote necessary to reverse the lower court deci-
sions.
3. Justice Stevens' Dissent
Three justices voted to affirm the district court's injunction grant-
ing KQED access to Santa Rita, subject to regulations established by
the sheriff. Justices Powell and Brennan joined Justice Stevens' dis-
senting opinion. 1 86 Justice Stevens reviewed the evidence presented at
181. Id at 18 (Stewart, J., concurring).
182. Id at 17-18.
183. See notes 86-113 and accompanying text supra.
184. 438 U.S. at 18.
185. Id
186. Id at 19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the district court hearing, emphasizing the inadequacy of the sheriffs
tour program.187 His characterization of the issue before the Court dif-
fered from that of the Chief Justice, who had not questioned the appli-
cability of the Pell-Saxbe holdings and who viewed KQED's claim as
an attempt to secure a special access privilege beyond that granted the
general public.'88 According to Justice Stevens, the controlling ques-
tions were actually: (1) whether Pell and Saxbe controlled cases such as
Houchins, where the applicable regulations afforded no public or press
access at all; and (2) if Pell and Saxbe did not preclude judicial relief
from regulations prohibiting access, whether the specific injunction
granted KQED was proper. 8 9 Justice Stevens found that Pell and
Saxbe should not be considered controlling because those decisions
were rendered in the context of prison systems which granted substan-
tial access that was not significantly affected when the Court upheld the
challenged regulations.' 90 In sharp contrast, Sheriff Houchins' policy
arbitrarily prohibited all press and public access to ascertain conditions
at the time when KQED filed suit. 9 ' Justice Stevens also found that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in tailoring its injunction
to meet the needs of KQED, and that a court need not withhold relief
for the press until members of the general public challenge the sheriffs
policies.' 92
In determining what the controlling authority should be, Justice
Stevens carefully distinguished Pell from Houchins. He noted that the
press in Pell claimed the right to interview specifically designated in-
mates, and that in evaluating this claim the Court did not merely in-
quire whether prison officials allowed members of the general public to
conduct such interviews.' 93 Instead, the Pell Court "canvassed the op-
portunities already available for both the public and the press to ac-
quire information regarding the prison and its inmates"' 194 and
specifically found that the regulation at issue was not "'part of an at-
tempt by the State to conceal conditions in its prisons.' "'191 Justice Ste-
vens also noted that the access restriction in Pell was imposed only
after actual experience had demonstrated that such interviews gave rise
to disciplinary problems' 96 and that it was "an isolated limitation'
197
187. Id at 19-23.
188. See text accompanying note 176 supra.
189. 438 U.S. at 24-25.
190. Id at 25-30.
191. Id at 26.
192. Id at 25.
193. Id at 28.
194. Id
195. Id, quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 830.
196. 438 U.S. at 28.
197. Id
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whose enforcement did not materially curtail the substantial access
otherwise available to the press and the public. Despite the regulation,
the prison policy in Pell therefore "accorded full opportunities to ob-
serve prison conditions"' g to both the press and the public. In Justice
Stevens' view, Houchins presented a wholly different situation in that
"[t]he public and the press had consistently been denied any access" to
the sections of Santa Rita in which prisoners were held.'99 He con-
cluded that the Pell Court's equation of public and press access rights
did not support the plurality's contention that non-discriminatory gov-
ernmental regulations prohibiting all access to public institutions can
withstand constitutional challenge.2 °" According to Justice Stevens, the
Pell decision did require that the constitutionality of the sheriffs no-
access policy be considered in the context of a broader question:
whether sufficient press and public opportunity to ascertain conditions
inside Santa Rita would exist if the regulation were allowed to stand. °'
He stated that Sheriff Houchins' policy could survive such scrutiny
"only if the Constitution affords no protection to the public's right to be
informed about conditions within. . . public institutions .... "202
According to Justice Stevens, the purpose underlying the press
clause is the protection of the societal function of the press rather than
protection of the press'as an institution.20 3 The no-access policy there-
fore violated the press clause by severely limiting the ability of the
press to fulfill that function. He pointed out that ensuring the "full and
free flow of information to the general public" has historically been a
"core objective" 2° ' of the First Amendment. As a result, both the dis-
semination and the receipt of ideas and information are constitution-
ally protected. 0 5 Justice Stevens emphasized that protecting this flow
of information "serves an essential societal function" in addition to
safeguarding individual rights.20 6 He found it entirely inadequate in
198. Id.
199. Id at 30.
200. Id "The decision in Pell, therefore, does not imply that a state policy of concealing
prison conditions from the press, or a policy denying the press any opportunity to observe
those conditions, could have been justified simply by pointing to like concealment from, and
denial to, the general public. If that were not true, there would have been no need to em-
phasize the substantial press and public access reflected in the record of that case." Id at 29
(footnote omitted).
201. Id "What Pell does indicate is that the question whether respondents established a
probability of prevailing on their constitutional claim is inseparable from the question
whether petitioner's policies unduly restricted the opportunities of the general public to
learn about the conditions of confinement in Santa Rita jail. As in Pell, in assessing its
adequacy, the total access of the public and the press must be considered." Id at 29-30.




206. Id at 31.
constitutional terms to limit press rights to protection of the institution:
It is not sufficient, therefore, that the channels of communication
be free of governmental restraints. Without some protection for
the acquisition of information about the operation of public insti-
tutions such as prisons by the public at large, the process of self-
governance contemplated by the Framers would be stripped of its
substance.2 °7
Justice Stevens supported his argument that the press clause protects
the societal function of the press with a discussion of Grosean v. Ameri-
can Press Co. 208 He focused on an aspect of Grosjean which the Chief
Justice ignored in his examination of that case-the Grosjean major-
ity's conclusion that informed public opinion is the most potent of all
restraints on misgovernment, and that the Constitution protects the
public from deliberate and calculated attempts to disrupt the flow of
information to the public.
209
Justice Stevens pointed out that Houchins presents a constitutional
issue for judicial review, not a policy question for legislative action.210
He also noted that the limited access granted KQED by the district
court should be upheld due to the non-confidential nature of the infor-
mation sought.21' Justice Stevens further emphasized that protecting
the flow of reliable information from jails, prisons and pre-trial deten-
tion facilities is particularly important since they are "public institu-
tions, financed with public funds and administered by public servants
.. ,,1212 He also noted that community interest in jail conditions
stems from the community's role as jurors whose decisions result in
207. Id at 32. In an accompanying footnote, Justice Stevens developed this point fur-
ther: "Admittedly, the right to receive or acquire information is not specifically mentioned
in the Constitution. But 'the protection of the Bill of Rights goes beyond the specific guaran-
tees to protect from... abridgement those equally fundamental personal rights necessary
to make the express guarantees fully meaningful .... The dissemination of ideas can ac-
complish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them.
It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.' Lamont v.
Postmaster General, 381 U.S., at 308 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). It would be an even
more barren marketplace that had willing buyers and sellers and no meaningful information
to exchange." Id at n.22.
208. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
209. 438 U.S. at 33 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See 297 U.S. at 250.
210. 438 U.S. at 34-36.
211. Id at 35-36. "In this case, however, '[r]espondents do not assert a right to force
disclosure of confidential information or to invade in any way the decisionmaking processes
of governmental officials.' They simply seek an end to petitioner's policy of concealing
prison conditions from the public. Those conditions are wholly without claim to confidenti-
ality. While prison officials have an interest in the time and manner of public acquisition of
information about the institutions they administer, there is no legitimate penological justifi-
cation for concealing from citizens the conditions in which their fellow citizens are being
confined." .d (footnotes omitted).
212. Id at 36 (footnote omitted).
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incarceration,2 13 and that the individual prisoner's personal constitu-
tional rights are best served where access to information regarding con-
ditions is least hampered: "While a ward of the State and subject to its
stern discipline, he retains constitutional protections against cruel and
unusual punishment, . . . a protection which may derive more practi-
cal support from access to information about prisons by the public than
by occasional litigation in a busy court." '214 He added that "in final
analysis, it is the citizens who bear responsibility for the treatment ac-
corded those confined within penal institutions." '215 He concluded that
the record clearly showed that Sheriff Houchins' policy constituted a
substantial and serious constitutional violation since the press' function
was impeded almost entirely:
In this case, the record demonstrates that both the public and the
press had been consistently denied any access to the inner por-
tions of Santa Rita jail,. . . and that there was no valid justifica-
tion for these broad restraints on the flow of information ...
[E]xistence of a constitutional violation rested upon the special
importance of allowing a democratic community access to knowl-
edge about how its servants were treating some of its members
who have been committed to their custody. An officialprison pol-
icy of concealing such knowledge from the public by arbitrarily
cutting off the flow of information at its source abridges the free-
dom of speech and of the press protected by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments....
In the final part of his opinion, Justice Stevens responded to Chief
Justice Burger's sweeping and general denial of the ability of federal
district courts to make legitimate assessments of the constitutionality of
government policies and regulations and to grant appropriate relief.2 7
Granting an injunction which provides relief beyond a mere prohibi-
tion against repetition of past illegal conduct is well within the tradi-
tional equitable powers of federal trial courts. And in exercising such
powers, courts have often required wrongdoers to take affirmative steps
to eliminate the effects of their illegal conduct even though no legal
duty to take remedial action existed.21 ' He found that the district
court's injunction, which would bring to light previously suppressed
213. Id "The citizens confined therein are temporarily, and sometimes permanently, de-
prived of their liberty as a result of a trial which must conform to the dictates of the Consti-
tution. . . It is important not only that the trial itself be fair, but also that the community
at large have confidence in the integrity of the proceeding. That public interest survives the
judgment of conviction and appropriately carries over to an interest in how the convicted
person is treated during his period of punishment and hoped-for rehabilitation." Id at 36-
37 (footnote omitted).
214. Id at 37 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
215. Id at n.33.
216. Id at 38 (emphasis added).
217. Id at 40.
218. Id
facts concerning conditions inside Santa Rita, was therefore an entirely
appropriate remedy.
219
C. Analysis of the Houchins Opinions
1. The Plurality
Chief Justice Burger agreed with two points raised by KQED in
support of the district court's injunction. He recognized that since each
person placed in prison effectively becomes "a ward of the state for
whom society assumes broad responsibility," and since penal facilities
are public institutions which require massive funding, the conditions
inside prisons are matters of great public concern.220 He also recog-
nized that an informed public makes more intelligent decisions and
that the press, acting as the "'eyes and ears' of the public," can be a
powerful and constructive force in contributing to informed public de-
bate.221 But relying on Justice Stewart's structural interpretation of the
press clause,222 he concluded that the government is not compelled to
provide the press with access to public institutions or governmentally-
held information.223
The Chief Justice analyzed several prior Court decisions in an at-
tempt to show that the Court has never recognized a First Amendment
right of access to gather information. 224 He focused on two cases which
had emphasized the importance of informed public opinion and consti-
tutional protection for the free press as a source of public informa-
tion.22 1 Grosjean v. American Press Co. 226 and Mills v. Alabama227 both
contain very broad language concerning the scope of First Amendment
press protection. In the Chief Justice's restrictive view they did not im-
ply the existence of a constitutional right of access beyond that ac-
corded the public.228 But the Grosjean court noted that decisions
construing the extent of protection for the press are not to be read as
limiting its scope to any particular form of restraint:
Liberty of the press within the meaning of the constitutional pro-
vision . . . meant "principally although not exclusively, immu-
nity from previous restraints or censorship." . . . "The evils to be
prevented were not the censorshp of the press merely, but any ac-
tion of the government by means of which it mightprevent such free
219. Id
220. Id at 8.
221. Id
222. See notes 81-82 and accompanying text supra.
223. 408 U.S. at 9.
224. Id at 9-12.
225. Id
226. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
227. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
228. See note 166 and accompanying text supra.
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and general discussion ofpublic matters as seems absolutely essen-
tial toprepare the peoplefor an intelligent exercise oftheir rights as
citizens. "229
The emphasis in Grosjean was therefore on protection of the societal
function of the press rather than protection of the press as an institu-
tion. Comparable language emphasizing the wide scope of protection
for the press' societal function can be found in Mills:
Thus the press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful
antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials and as
a constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elected by
the people responsible to all the people whom they were selected
to serve. Suppression of the right of the press. . . muzzles one of
the very agencies the Framers of our Constitution. . .selected to
improve our society and keep it free.230
The explicit language of both Grosean and Mills thus undermines the
Chief Justice's narrow reading of those cases.
In a further attempt to rebut KQED's claim of entitlement to a
constitutional right of access, the Chief Justice equated KQED's posi-
tion with that of the appellant in Zemel v. Rusk.2 I He quoted former
Chief Justice Warren's rejection of First Amendment claims in Zemel,
which concluded that "[t]he right to speak and publish does not carry
with it the unrestrained right to gather information. 2 32 But the Zemel
Court stated only that the First Amendment does not guarantee an un-
restrained right to gather information;23 3 it did not imply that no such
right exists. Additionally, the facts underlying Zemel did not involve
press access to public institutions to ascertain conditions therein.
Zemel was a private citizen challenging a State Department regulation
which prohibited him from visiting Cuba. The Court rejected his con-
tention that as an American citizen he had a First Amendment right to
visit Cuba to inform himself of the conditions there.234 The context of
Zemel was thus far removed from that of Houchins and its reasoning is
not entitled to the broad application given to it by the plurality.
The Chief Justice also cited Branzburg v. Hayes235 in support of
his argument that there is no constitutional right to gather news. He
construed the express limitation of the constitutionally protected news-
gathering right as a denial of any First Amendment protection. 3 6 But
the Branzburg Court accompanied its list of limitations on press access
with the statement that without some First Amendment protection for
229. 297 U.S. at 249-50 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
230. 384 U.S. at 219.
231. 381 U.S. 1 (1965). See text accompanying note 171 supra.
232. 381 U.S. at 16-17.
233. Id
234. See 438 U.S. at 11-12.
235. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). See notes 62-64 and 71-75 and accompan.ing text supra.
236. See note 170 and accompanying text supra.
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newsgathering, freedom of the press could be "eviscerated.1 237 Al-
though the Branzburg Court rejected the claim that constitutional pro-
tection for newsgathering supported a privilege to refuse to testify
before grand juries, it did not endorse a sweeping rejection of all First
Amendment challenges to restraints on access to news.2 38 In relying on
Branzburg, the Chief Justice utilized the same approach which he
adopted in applying Zemel to Houchins: he interpreted recognition of a
limited right as a denial that any broader right exists, and applied a
narrow holding formulated in the context of a limited situation to a
remote and distinguishable set of facts.
In applying the rule of equal access announced in Pell and
Saxbe239 to Houchins, Chief Justice Burger glossed over two aspects of
those cases: (1) although public and press rights had been equated by
the Court, neither was defined as to the extent of constitutional protec-
tion to be afforded;24 and (2) Pell and Saxbe concerned situations in
which the public and the press already had substantial access to ascer-
tain prison conditions at first hand, whereas Sheriff Houchins' policy
allowed no access at all at the time the suit was brought.24' In this
analysis the Chief Justice also ignored several assumptions which have
traditionally carried substantial weight in discussions of First Amend-
ment issues. He failed to examine the particular facts of Houchins in
applying rules formulated in remote fact situations to foreclose the pos-
sibility of relief for KQED, although courts have been extremely sensi-
tive to factual context in evaluating the impact of governmental policies
on First Amendment freedoms.24 2 By endorsing the sheriffs broad de-
nial of access, Chief Justice Burger failed to recognize that governmen-
tal restrictions affecting free expression should be drawn with great
precision. Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in Houchins, with its
thorough review of the impact of sheriffs policy and the interests it
served, demonstrates an alternative approach to resolving the issues
before the Court.
2. The Dissent
Justice Stevens noted that the Court has never intimated that a
nondiscriminatory policy, that nevertheless entirely excludes both the
public and the press from access to information about jail conditions,
237. 408 U.S. at 681.
238. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 859 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting opin-
ion).
239. See notes 86-113 and accompanying text supra.
240. See note 113 and accompanying text supra.
241. Id
242. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
243. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
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could avoid constitutional scrutiny.24 Prior cases failed to define the
extent of the constitutional right to gather news beyond equating the
right of the press with that of the public. 245 Such decisions listed cer-
tain situations from which the press can properly be excluded2 46 and
denied that the right to gather news gives the press a privilege against
testifying before grand juries.247 None of these cases, however, denied
the existence of First Amendment protection for newsgathering. The
Pell Court emphasized the minimal restraint on the flow of informa-
tion concerning prison conditions caused by the challenged regulation
and the substantial alternative access afforded both the public and
press.24 This focus on the importance of existing opportunities for ac-
cess implies that a nondiscriminatory policy excluding everyone from
public institutions and severely limiting access to information about
conditions therein would require a rule more complex than a mere
equating of press and public rights.
The plurality opinion maintained that Houchins presented a dis-
pute which the legislature rather than the judiciary should resolve.249
Before Houchins reached the Supreme Court, there had been no sug-
gestion by the lower courts that the question of press access at Santa
Rita involved legislative policy questions rather than a legal question
as to the scope of constitutional protection. Responsible administrative
action, not legislation, had resulted in the successful, open and efficient
access policies in effect at other prisons and jails neighboring Santa
Rita.5 0 The dissent pointed out that there is nothing novel in the in-
junctive relief granted by the district court to KQED, even though that
remedy went beyond a mere prohibition of further unlawful conduct
by the sheriff-
In situations which are both numerous and varied the chancellor
has required . . . affirmative steps to eliminate the effects of a
violation of law even though the law itself imposes no duty to
take the remedial action. . . . [Ilt is perfectly clear that the court
had power to enter an injunction which was broader than a mere
prohibition against illegal conduct.
25'
The dissent did not speak directly to the propriety of legislative
action to insure access, since it found that the Constitution protects the
right to gather news. It agreed that the degree of public scrutiny to
244. 438 U.S. at 27-28.
245. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 834. See note 113 and accompanying text supra.
246. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 684-85.
247. Id at 685.
248. The Pell opinion emphasized the substantial access available despite the effect of
the challenged regulation on three occasions. 417 U.S. at 830-31, 831 n.8, 833.
249. 438 U.S. at 12.
250. See notes 125-29 and accompanying text supra.
251. 438 U.S. at 40.
which most government activity should be exposed involves policy
questions best left to the political branches.252 However, Justice Ste-
vens noted an important distinction between situations in which gov-
ernmental secrecy concerning its operations is necessary and subject to
legislative oversight and Sheriff Houchins' policy of concealing prison
conditions from the public:
Those conditions are wholly without claim to confidentiality.
While prison officials have an interest in the time and manner of
public acquisition of information about the institutions they ad-
minister, there is no legitimate penological justification for con-
cealing from citizens the conditions in which their fellow citizens
are being confined.253
The plurality opinion authored by Chief Justice Burger failed to
recognize this distinction, and the Houchins decision limits public and
press recourse for access to gather information to legislative interfer-
ence with jail administration-an area which legislatures and the
courts have generally left to the exclusive control of the executive
branch. Press and public access to federal prisons is controlled by the
Bureau of Prisons.254 California's state prisons are subject to regula-
tions promulgated by the director of the state's Department of Correc-
tions; 255 local correctional facilities are administered by the county
sheriff.2 56 Prior Supreme Court decisions have recognized that, in the
absence of constitutional violations, jail and prison officials should be
allowed broad discretion in administering their institutions.
25 7
An example of judicial deference to the expertise of prison officials
is found in the Pell Court's discussion of state prison visiting rules:
In the judgment of the state corrections officials, this visitation
policy will permit inmates to have personal contact with those
persons who will aid in their rehabilitation, while keeping visita-
tions at a manageable level that will not compromise institutional
security. Such considerations are peculiarly within the province
and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the ab-
sence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the
officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations,
courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgement in such
matters. Courts cannot, of course, abdicate their constitutional
responsibility to delineate and protect fundamental liberties.
258
The traditional role of the courts in reviewing jail and prison policies
for constitutional violations was summarized by the federal district
252. Id at 34.
253. Id at 35-36 (footnote omitted).
254. See Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
255. CAL. PENAL CODE § 5058 (West Supp. 1979).
256. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 26605 (West 1968).
257. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 823-24, 826-27.
258. Id at 827.
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court which ultimately held in Brenneman v. Madigan259 that the condi-
tions at Santa Rita constituted cruel and unusual punishment:
The federal courts do not sit to superintend the administra-
tion of the county jail system; but what they do sit to do, and
what they must do, is insure that those who administer that sys-
tem comply with the requirements of the Constitution: The duty
to confront and resolve constitutional questions, regardless of their
diculty or magnitude, is the very essence of the judicial responsi-
bility. While the federal courts must be sensitive to the problems
created by unwarranted judicial interference with the administra-
tion of state penal institutions. . . when questions of constitutional
dimension arise, the courts cannot simply abdicate theirfunction out
of misplaced deference to some sort of "hands off' doctrine.260
The plurality approach would have the courts abandon their duty to
confront and resolve difficult constitutional questions; it would also
have the legislature hamper jail administrators' discretion with statutes
that may or may not be suitable to their particular institutions. Crea-
tion of effective jail regulations and policies requires great flexibility,
expertise and experience. Press and public access problems require the
accommodation of the needs of the public and the press, legitimate pe-
nal objectives such as rehabilitation, punishment and deterence and the
safety, convenience and privacy of those who live and work inside the
facility. Formulation of adequate state-wide or system-wide regula-
tions would present a tremendous burden to legislative bodies, but in
the absence of such legislation, the Houchins decision aids those jail
officials who wish to conceal conditions by enabling them to prohibit
first-hand, independent press and public inspection of their facilities.
3. Justice Stewart's Concurrence
In his concurring opinion in Houchins, Justice Stewart did not
comment on the plurality's denial of the ability of federal trial courts to
formulate injunctive relief in First Amendment cases. He agreed, how-
ever, that the question of whether a public institution must open its
doors is a legislative rather than a constitutional issue.26' Although he
joined the plurality in holding that the decision granting the prelimi-
nary injunction should be reversed, he emphasized that the possibility
of further relief to KQED should not be foreclosed on remand.262 In
his view, the injunction was overbroad in two respects: it allowed press
access to areas of the jail from which the public was barred, and it
allowed the press to interview inmates with whom the general public
259. 343 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
260. Id at 130-31 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
261. 438 U.S. at 16 n.*.
262. Id at 17-18. See notes 82-83 and accompanying text supra.
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was not allowed to speak.263
Under Justice Stewart's analysis, the First Amendment protects
the press as an institution rather than protecting its societal function. A
regulation which limits access for newsgathering by restraining the
function of the press does not violate its constitutional rights as an insti-
tution as long as the regulation is not discriminatory. Thus Justice
Stewart held that, absent such uneven treatment, the First Amendment
may not be invoked by the press or the public in an attempt to gain
access to public institutions: "The Constitution does no more than as-
sure the public and the press equal access once government has opened
its doors."2"
In a footnote, Justice Stewart cited his concurring opinion in New
York Times Co. v. United States265 and stated that "[florces and factors
other than the Constitution must determine what government-held
data are to be made available to the public. ' 266 However, New York
Times concerned the necessity for governmental secrecy in defense and
foreign affairs matters; it did not involve access to public institutions to
gather non-confidential information regarding conditions therein. And
in his concurring opinion in that case, Justice Stewart limited his com-
ments to national defense and foreign affairs data in the hands of the
executive branch.267 Although he emphasized that the ideal executive
policy would allow maximum public disclosure,268 there is no indica-
tion that this view should be applied to any field outside national de-
fense and foreign affairs, nor any specific suggestions for implementing
it. Justice Stewart's New York Times concurring opinion therefore does
not support his rejection of the propriety of constitutionaly-based re-
lief from denials of access to information.
4. Summary
In reversing the lower court decision granting the preliminary in-
junction, the plurality and Justice Stewart relied on the latter's view
that the First Amendment protects the press as an institution. This
structural interpretation of the press clause protects the press from dis-
criminatory governmental regulations, but it does not provide any con-
stitutional protection for newsgathering if the government adopts a
policy (like that of Sheriff Houchins) which denies access to both the
public and the press on a non-discriminatory basis. According to the
263. 438 U.S. at 18.
264. Id at 16 (footnote omitted).
265. 403 U.S. 713, 727 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).
266. 438 U.S. at 16 n.*, citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728-
30 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).
267. Id
268. Id at 729.
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Houchins majority, access policy presents questions which are best re-
solved by the legislature. These four justices differed, however, on the
application of the Pell-Saxbe equal access rule269 to Houchins.
Whereas Justice Stewart found that equal access must be implemented
with flexibility in order to accommodate the practical differences in the
needs of the press and the public, the plurality held that equal access
mandates identical regulations for both groups.
In contrast to this approach to the question of constitutional pro-
tection for newsgathering, Justice Stevens' dissent relied on the inter-
pretation of the First Amendment which extends protection for the
societal function of the press. Under this view, governmental regula-
tions which restrain the flow of information to the public violate the
First Amendment if, like Sheriff Houchins' access policy, they unjustifi-
ably restrict the right of the press and the public to gather news. In his
view, the preliminary injunction represented an appropriate remedy
and was within the traditional scope of the trial court's equitable pow-
ers.
The main reason that the Court split over the question of whether
administrators violate the First Amendment by totally denying the
public and the press access to public institutions to gather information
regarding conditions therein is that the seven justices who participated
in the decision divided as to the proper interpretation of "or of the
press." The four justice Houchins majority adopted Justice Stewart's
structural analysis while the dissenters supported the societal function
view. The relative merits of these divergent approaches to the rights of
the press under the First Amendment will be discussed in the next sec-
tion of the note.
III. The First Amendment and The Press: Structural or
Functional Protection
Three different views of the press clause were discussed at the be-
ginning of this note. One view holds that the rights guaranteed by the
press clause are identical to those guaranteed to the public by the
speech clause.27° The second view holds that press protection is limited
to that which England afforded its press when our Constitution was
adopted, or to those threats to press freedom perceived by the Fram-
ers. 271 The third view holds that the press is entitled to broad protec-
tion beyond that guaranteed to the public under the speech clause or
perceived by either the English or the Americans of the late eighteenth
269. See notes 86-113 and accompanying text supra.
270. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
271. See notes 43-45 and accompanying text supra.
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Houchins v. KQED, Inc. was the first case to present the issue of
press access to public institutions for purposes of gathering non-confi-
dential information. It is therefore the first case in which the impor-
tance of the theoretical difference between the structural and functional
interpretations has emerged. The issues in Pell, Saxbe, and Branzburg
involved press claims for special privileges in situations in which gov-
ernmental restrictions imposed burdens on newsgathering that were ei-
ther difficult to evaluate or arguably insubstantial.273 In Houchins,
however, the sheriffs policy concealed prison conditions from the pub-
lic "by arbitrarily cutting off the flow of news at its source ... ."274
Sheriff Houchins' absolute denial of effective press access did not raise
as many peripheral considerations as did the regulations in Pell and
Saxbe because in Houchins the burden on the press was much more
absolute: there were virtually no alternative means of obtaining infor-
mation about conditions inside Santa Rita.275 Nor did the sheriff in
Houchins have any justification for his restrictions on newsgathering
that were as important to the public interest as the investigative powers
of the grand jury which were held to outweigh the press claim in
Branzburg.2 76 The following sections will evaluate these conflicting
views, with emphasis on their relative contributions to the democratic
process.
A. The Structural Interpretation
Justice Stewart's historical argument in support of the structural
interpretation of the press clause was discussed in the first section of
this note.27 7 His view requires the same sort of limited reading of prior
press cases, such as Grosjean and Mills, which the Chief Justice utilized
in Houchins.278 The structural theory emphasizes that the First
Amendment supports the press as an institution.279 Justice Stewart's
majority opinions in Pell and Saxbe upheld regulations restricting
newsgathering and the flow of information to the public. Since these
regulations did not discriminate against the press by granting it less
access than was accorded the public, they did not impair the institu-
tional position of the press.280 The regulations challenged by the press
272. See notes 49-50 and accompanying text supra.
273. For a discussion of Pell and Saxbe, see note 89 and accompanying text supra. For a
discussion of Branzburg see note 62 and accompanying text supra.
274. 438 U.S. at 38.
275. Id at 25-26.
276. Id at 38.
277. See notes 81-82 and accompanying text supra.
278. See notes 224-30 and accompanying text supra.
279. 438 U.S. at 31-32.
280. See note 104 and accompanying text supra.
Spring 1979]
970 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 6:933
in Pel and Saxbe arguably hampered its function by limiting the op-
portunity to obtain first-hand information by interviewing particular
inmates. However, since the function of the press is not protected by
the Constitution under Justice Stewart's view, he held that governmen-
tal restraints on newsgathering do not present constitutional ques-
tions.281 As the Houchins dissent noted, under the structural view there
is no constitutional protection for access to information and the press
therefore may not be able to publish any information about govern-
ment operations that would aid a self-governing people.282 The struc-
tural interpretation of the press clause, which protects the institution
but allows restriction of its essential functions, elevates the press' status
as a formal institution over its ability to perform its substantial function
in a democratic society.
The Houchins plurality's reliance on Justice Stewart's view is evi-
dent in the statement that media representatives are -components" of
our society,283 the narrow readings of Mills and Grosjean,284 and the
reliance on Pell, Saxbe, and Justice Stewart's 1974 speech.285 The
strongest evidence of the adoption of this approach is the conclusion
that there is no constitutional protection for newsgathering.
B. Constitutional Protection for the Societal Function of the Press
The societal function of the press was described by Justice Powell
in his dissenting opinion in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co. :286
An informed public depends on accurate and effective reporting
by the news media. No individual can obtain for himself the in-
formation needed for the intelligent discharge of his political re-
sponsibilities. For most citizens the prospect of personal
familiarity with newsworthy events is hopelessly unrealistic. In
seeking out the news the press therefore acts as an agent of the
public at large. It is the means by which the people receive that
free flow of information and ideas essential to intelligent self-
government. By enabling the public to assert meaningful control
over the political process, the press performs a crucial function in
effecting the societal purpose of the First Amendment.287
Like those who advocate the structural interpretation of the press
clause, Justice Powell bases his functional interpretation on the explicit
mention of the press by the Framers. 88 In the view of Justice Powell
281. See "Or of the Press," supra note 39, at 636.
282. 438 U.S. at 32 nn.22 & 23.
283. Id at 8.
284. See notes 24-30 and accompanying text supra.
285. 438 U.S. at 11, 14-15.
286. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
287. Id at 863 (Powell, J., dissenting).
288. See notes 28, 81-82 and accompanying text supra.
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and the other justices who dissented in Houchins, the Framers were
concerned with protecting the press role in the maintenance of an in-
formed citizenry. Justice Stevens' Houchins dissent cited Madison in
support of this position: "A popular Government, withofit popular in-
formation, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or
a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance:
And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm them-
selves with the power which knowledge gives." '289
What is at stake in press access cases such as Houchins, Pell, and
Saxbe is the preservation of free public discussion of governmental af-
fairs. Since the United States is committed to popular self-determina-
tion and development of sound national policy through the free
exchange of views on public issues, "public debate must not only be
unfettered; it must also be informed."290 The Houchins dissent views
information gathering as entitled to some measure of constitutional
protection because merely prohibiting governmental interference with
the institutional aspects of the press, the "channels of communication,"
291 thprovides insufficient protection for the democratic process. In the
words of Justice Stevens, "[w]ithout some protection for the acquisition
of information about the operation of public institutions such as pris-
ons by the public at large, the process of self-governance contemplated
by the Framers would be stripped of its substance. 292
Advocates of the functional interpretation of the press clause need
not impose artificially narrow readings on cases like Grosjean and
Mills.293 Careful consideration of those cases reveals that the Court's
object was preservation of the flow of information to the public, not
just the elimination of an objectionable local tax or statute. 94 The
functional view of the press clause does not force its advocates into
unnaturally broad readings of Zemel and Branzburg which transform
limitations on the constitutional right to gather news into a denial of
the very existence of that right.2 95 As Justice Powell stated in his Saxbe
dissent:
Those precedents arose in contexts far removed from that of the
instant case, and in my view neither controls here. To the extent
that Zemel and Branzburg speak to the issue before us, they re-
289. 438 U.S. at 31-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting), quoting IX WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 103 (G. Hurst ed. 1910).
290. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 862-63 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also
Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919).
291. 438 U.S. at 32.
292. Id
293. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S.
233 (1936).
294. See notes 224-30 and accompanying text supra.
295. See notes 231-38 and accompanying text supra.
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flect no more than a sensible disinclination to follow the right-to-
access argument as far as dry logic might extend.296
Governmental regulations which do not significantly affect the societal
function of the press and which do not have a "palpable impact on the
underlying right of the public to information needed to assert ultimate
control over the political process" are not subject to challenge under
this view.297 The proper standard for determining the constitutionality
of challenged prison or jail regulations or policies is the test formulated
by the Supreme Court in United States v. O'Brien298 and applied by the
district court and the Ninth Circuit to Houchins.2 99
Since the structural interpretation denies the existence of constitu-
tional questions in press access cases, the plurality of the Court in
Houchins and Justice Stewart in his concurrence were spared the task
of applying the O'Brien test to the sheriffs policy. As Justice Powell
said of the majority position in Saxbe, "[t]he Court's resolution of this
case has the virtue of simplicity."300 By applying the structural inter-
pretation of the press clause to deny constitutional protection for news-
gathering, the Houchins majority was attempting to force the courts to
abandon their traditional role of enforcing freedoms guaranteed by the
First Amendment.3"'
Conclusion
The press is afforded broad protection by the First Amendment,
but whether that protection includes a right of access to public institu-
tions to gather information concerning conditions therein depends
upon whether one accepts the structural interpretation of the press
clause or the interpretation which extends protection to the societal
function of the press. Constitutional protection for newsgathering in
the absence of discriminatory governmental regulations follows directly
from the functional interpretation, while the structural interpretation
leads to the denial of such protection.
The question of constitutional protection for newsgathering was
presented to the Court by Houchins v. KQED, Inc. The seven justices
who participated in the decision were sharply divided on the question
of the existence of this constitutional right and the propriety of the dis-
trict court's preliminary injunction. Four justices denied that the First
Amendment was violated by a jail policy which prevented any effective
press access to gather news and therefore voted to reverse the injunc-
296. 417 U.S. at 860 (Powell, J., dissenting).
297. Id at 872.
298. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See note 144 supra.
299. See notes 143-45 and accompanying text supra.
300. 417 U.S. at 875 (Powell, J., dissenting).
301. See notes 258-60 and accompanying text supra.
tion. Three justices, adopting the functional approach, found that the
policy was a clear constitutional violation and voted to affirm the in-
junction.
Perhaps the next time the Court agrees to review a case presenting
the issue of the constitutional protection to which newsgathering is en-
titled it, will reach a decision which will produce a greater consensus
within the Court. In the interim, however, legislation is needed to
guarantee the right of the press and the public to enter public institu-
tions to ascertain the conditions therein, since the Houchins Court
failed to provide effective protection for these fundamental constitu-
tional interests. Unless jail administrators are willing to provide access
voluntarily so that the public can learn about the conditions and activi-
ties within penal institutions, the press, the public and the inmates must
rely on the legislature rather than the courts to provide some "sunlight
in the county jail."302
302. Brief for Respondents at 62, Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
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